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Abstract 
We analyse worker self-selection with a special focus on teachers. The point of the 
paper is that worker composition is generally endogenous, due to worker self-
selection. In a first step we analyse lab experimental data to provide causal evidence 
on particular sorting patterns. This evidence sets the stage for our field data analysis, 
which focuses specifically on selection patterns of teachers. We find that teachers are 
more risk averse than employees in other professions, which indicates that relatively 
risk averse individuals sort into teaching occupations under the current system. Using 
survey measures on trust and reciprocity we also find that teachers trust more and are 
less negatively reciprocal than other employees. Finally, we establish differences in 
personality based on the Big Five concept.  
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In this paper we analyse the impact of incentives on worker self-selection, with a 
particular focus on the education system. Typically economists are interested in how 
incentives affect behaviour of a given workforce. The rationale for providing 
performance related pay is to align the interests of principals and agents in order to 
increase performance motivation. However, output does not only depend on effort 
provision but also on the composition of the workforce, i.e., employees’ abilities, 
attitudes and personalities. The point of this paper is that worker composition is 
endogenous, due to worker self-selection: Agents with different characteristics and 
personality feel attracted by different types of incentives. In this sense providing 
incentives in firms or organisations has two important effects, an incentive effect per 
se and a selection effect. Importantly, these effects need not to be complementary. In 
the education system, for example, it may well be that changing from fixed pay 
systems to performance related pay schemes increases effort, but at the cost that 
currently selected teachers are dissatisfied and that the personality profile of newly 
attracted teachers fits requirements less well than under the status quo. On the other 
hand, if variable pay attracts more productive and able teachers, the selection effect 
positively adds to the incentive effect in terms of raising overall output. In this paper 
we do not study whether selection effects induced by performance incentives will 
have adverse or beneficial effects. What the paper shows, however, is that in as much 
as individual characteristics of teachers, and employees in general, matter for the 
success of organisations, neglecting selection effects is problematic.  
 We proceed in three steps. In the first step we discuss and reanalyse data from 
a laboratory experiment by Dohmen and Falk (2010).1 The laboratory evidence sets 
                                                 
1 Dohmen and Falk (2010) builds on data from additional sessions. The analyses in the current paper 
are based on the data that was available for the working paper version (see Dohmen and Falk, 2006) 
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the stage for our later analysis of sorting effects for teachers. The idea is to establish 
causality of sorting patterns in a controlled environment and to use these patterns to 
predict similar outcomes in the field. In the experiment subjects face the alternative to 
earn money either under a fixed wage regime or a variable pay scheme. We show that 
variable pay schemes attract more productive workers, as predicted by economic 
theory. We also show that women are less likely to choose a variable pay scheme and 
that being risk averse reduces individuals’ willingness to work for variable pay. The 
advantage of laboratory data is that it provides the researcher with knowledge about 
individual characteristics while being able to observe the selection decision in a well-
defined environment. This allows for drawing causal inferences, which is typically 
disputable when relying solely on field data.2  
 In the second step we analyse employee selection between the private and the 
public sector in Germany because teachers are public employees. The public sector is 
largely characterized by fixed payment schemes, whereas pay for performance 
schemes are more frequent in the private sector. In addition the threat of 
unemployment is basically absent in the public sector but provides strong 
performance incentives in the private sector. Based on the results from the laboratory 
experiment we predict that employees in the public sector should be more risk averse 
and that men are less likely to work in the public sector than women, compared to the 
private sector. These predictions are borne out by the data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP). In addition we find differences in personality and 
social preferences. 
                                                 
2 For example, in the field agents are typically working under a mix of incentives such as explicit 
performance incentives and implicit contracts, rendering the isolation of incentive specific effects 
difficult. Moreover, one cannot rule out the possibility that changes in incentive schemes are 
endogenous, which renders causal inferences difficult. On the complementarity of lab and field 
experimental evidence see Falk and Heckman (2009). 
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 In the third step we look specifically at selection patterns of teachers. We 
compare teachers with other similarly qualified employees. We find that teachers are 
more risk averse than employees in other professions, which indicates that relatively 
risk averse individuals sort into teaching occupations under the current system. Using 
survey measures on trust and reciprocity we also find that teachers trust more and are 
less negatively reciprocal than other employees. Finally, we establish differences in 
personality based on the Big Five concept.  
 Our results suggest that changes in the incentive system will affect well-being 
of incumbent teachers in the short-run and will change the composition of teachers in 
the long-run. Well-being is affected because variable pay exposes teachers to 
additional risk. Since incumbent teachers have selected on the basis of fixed payment 
schemes, job satisfaction is likely to fall among these relatively risk averse teachers. 
This effect is reinforced if the introduction of variable pay comes along with reduced 
job security. The composition is likely to change in the long run simply because the 
new remuneration scheme attracts different types of teachers. Whether the individual 
characteristics of the newly selected teachers are better or worse for overall outcomes 
in the education system cannot be answered with our data. It is likely that the effect 
on work attitude and ability is positive but that there are also potentially negative 
effects with respect to social preferences and teacher personality in general.  
Our findings complement an extensive literature on teacher supply. This 
literature has focused mainly on the role of relative wages, earnings profiles or career 
considerations (for an overview see Dolton, 2006). In contrast we concentrate on the 
role of incentive pay and the interaction of personality and modes of payment. This is 
particularly relevant given the importance of teacher quality for student achievement 
and the fact that non-pecuniary factors such as personality must play an important role 
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to become a teacher at all. This follows from Dolton (2006), who, summarizing 
evidence for the USA and the UK, concludes that “if earnings were the only criteria 
used to decide a career then no men would become teachers in these countries.” p. 
1150). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes 
arguments for why personal characteristics such as ability, risk aversion, social 
preferences and gender might affect the decision to sort into particular pay schemes. 
Section 3 discusses the laboratory evidence on worker self-selection and sets the stage 
for our analysis of employees in the private vs. the public sector as well as teachers 
vs. other employees (Section 4). Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. Theoretical Arguments for the Effects of Remuneration Schemes on Sorting 
If subjects face the choice between a fixed wage contract and a variable pay contract, 
it is obvious that the probability of preferring the variable pay contract is higher the 
more productive a worker is. To exemplify, consider the choice between a fixed-
payment contract that pays a wage of fixed independent of output and a piece rate 
contract that pays a piece rate of  for each unit of output  produced, so that the 
wage  under the piece rate scheme equals . Furthermore assume that output is 
produced according to the production function , where  measures 
ability,  measures costly effort and  is a white noise error term. If a worker’s utility 
depends positively on the wage w and negatively on effort  according to the utility 
function with  and , it is straightforward to 
show that a worker whose productivity exceeds a certain threshold value optimally 
opts for the piece-rate contract, while a worker with lower productivity prefers the 
fixed-payment. In the absence of risk (i.e., without random noise in production) or in 
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case of risk neutrality, this productivity threshold is given by  
, where  is the optimal effort level that satisfies  
and  is the minimal enforceable effort level in the fixed wage regime. The 
productivity threshold increases in the level of the fixed payment, and it decreases in 
the attractiveness of the piece rate. In a similar vein it can be shown that more 
productive workers are also more likely prefer other prototypical variable pay 
schemes such as tournament or revenue-sharing contracts to fixed wage contracts. 
It is also clear that risk aversion affects the choice between variable pay and fixed 
wage contracts. Principal-agent theory has emphasized that risk-averse workers 
dislike the income risk that is associated with variable pay when output depends upon 
factors beyond their control, e.g., if random noise affects production. In such a 
situation, income under variable pay schemes are risky, while no such risk is eminent 
in a fixed wage regime in which payments are independent of output. As a 
consequence the expected utility from variable pay is lower for risk averse subjects 
than for risk neutral or risk loving subjects. Hence we expect that subjects are less 
likely to select into variable pay the more risk averse they are.  
Another potential driver of self-selection are social preferences. Traditional 
contract theory is based on the assumption that principals and agents are solely 
interested in their own material payoffs. However, considerable evidence indicates 
that a substantial fraction of people also care about reciprocal fairness (see, e.g., Fehr 
and Gächter, 2006). The co-existence of selfish and reciprocally motivated agents 
changes the optimality conditions of different types of contracts (see Fehr, Klein and 
Schmidt, 2007). Recently, several theoretical studies have highlighted how social 
preferences affect optimal contract design (see, e.g., Grund and Sliwka, 2005; 
Englmaier and Wambach, forthcoming; and Kosfeld and von Siemens, 2007). 
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Finally, several studies have emphasized that gender affects the sorting 
decision into competitive compensation schemes (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 
2007). These studies suggest that women are more likely than men to prefer non-
competitive and non-variable pay. 
 
2. Self-selection in the Laboratory 
In this section we discuss the experiment by Dohmen und Falk (2010) and reanalyse 
their data. The idea of their experiment is to show the existence of multidimensional 
sorting, i.e., to isolate individual characteristics that are relevant in the process of 
sorting into different incentive schemes. While many laboratory experiments have 
studied the incentive effects of different incentive systems, such as piece-rate or 
tournaments, only few experiments have systematically investigated whether and how 
agents with different characteristics feel attracted by different incentives schemes (see 
Dohmen and Falk (2010) for a discussion).  
 Dohmen and Falk (2010) study self-selection into variable pay focusing on the 
role of individual productivity, willingness to take risks, social preferences, relative 
self-assessment, personality and gender. The experiment consists of three phases, (i) 
elicitation of productivity, (ii) sorting and working under different incentives and (iii) 
elicitation of personal characteristics. The work task consists of the multiplication of a 
two-digit and a one-digit number with five degrees of difficulty.3 Difficulty varies 
because different levels of working memory are involved. This real effort task is 
useful for the purpose at hand, as it requires no previous knowledge and is simple to 
explain. Moreover, the task sufficiently differentiates subjects’ performance, and task 
                                                 
3 Examples for the different difficulty levels are: Level 1: 11*9 = ???; Level 2: 3*32 = ???; Level 3: 
6*43 = ???; Level 4: 4*68 = ???; Level 5: 7*89 = ??? 
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performance is a proxy for general cognitive ability. Learning effects that could 
possibly confound the measure are expected to be absent. 
 In the first phase of the experiment we gauge individual productivity. One of 
the indicators measures how fast subjects can solve a multiplication problem. To this 
end they are asked to calculate a multiplication problem of difficulty level 4 as fast as 
possible. The time that elapsed before the correct answer was entered on the computer 
screen is used as an indication for productivity related to the specific task of the 
experiment. It turns out that this indicator is also a pretty good proxy for general 
ability as it is significantly correlated with the final math grade in high school — a 
measure that ranges from 1, the worst grade, to 15, the best grade — and with the 
final high-school grade point average (Abitur) — a measure that ranges from 4.0, the 
worst grade, to 1.0, the best grade. The Spearman rank correlations and corresponding 
p-values of math grades and Abitur grades are -0.28 (p < 0.001) and 0.29 (p < 0.001), 
respectively. Later we will use the productivity indicator together with grades to study 
ability based self-selection. 
After the elicitation of individual productivity indicators subjects made a 
decision how to earn money in a 10 minute working phase. They could either choose 
to work for a fixed payment or a variable payment. The fixed payment guaranteed an 
amount of money (400 points) independent of correctly solved multiplication 
problems. In contrast, if a subject chose a variable payment scheme, actual payments 
varied in the number of correctly solved problems. Dohmen and Falk (2010) study 
three treatments. In each treatment subjects can choose between a fixed payment and 
a variable payment. The difference between treatments is the type of variable pay: 
piece rate, tournament or revenue sharing. In the piece-rate condition subjects receive 
a piece rate (10 points) for each correctly solved problem. In the tournament treatment 
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two subjects compete against each other. The subject with the higher number of 
correctly solved problems gets a high prize (1300 points), the other gets a low prize (0 
points). Finally, in the revenue-sharing condition two subjects are paid according to 
their joint output. Joint output is multiplied by 10 (as in the piece-rate treatment) and 
equally divided between the two members of the team.  
In the third phase of the experiment, we elicited several preference and 
personality indicators. In this paper we will concentrate on the role of risk attitudes, 
which we measured in the experiment with a simple questionnaire measure. We use 
answers on an 11-point scale to the question “How do you see yourself: Are you 
generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking 
risks?”, where the value 0 means ‘completely unwilling to take risks’ and the value 10 
means ‘completely willing to take risks’. We use this question for two reasons. First, it 
is exactly the same as we use below to study risk attitudes in the SOEP. This eases 
comparison between our lab and field evidence. Second, we are confident about the 
behavioral validity of this survey measure, because it predicts a wide variety of 
economically relevant behaviors (e.g., investment in stocks, self-employment, and 
migration behavior) and has been validated in a large-scale field experiment, using a 
representative sample of 450 German adults (for details see Dohmen et al., 2010).  
In this paper we pool the data from all three treatments and study how 
productivity and other individual characteristics affect the likelihood to self-select 
into variable pay. In total 56 percent of the 240 subjects chose the variable pay 
scheme.4 Table 1 shows how these subjects can be characterised. The first column of 
Table 1 shows that productivity has a positive effect on working under variable pay. 
We use two measures of individual productivity or ability, the time it takes to solve a 
                                                 
4 In order to have an even sample of men and women, we recruited in a way such that out of our 240 
subjects 121 are female and 119 are male. In Dohmen and Falk (2010) we ran additional sessions and 
analyse decisions of 360 subjects. 
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problem of difficulty level 4 (Productivity) and the final high-school grade point 
average (Abitur), which ranges from 1.0 (very good) to 4.0 (sufficient). We also 
include dummies for the piece-rate treatment (PT) and the revenue sharing treatment 
(RT). The tournament treatment is the reference category. The coefficient estimates 
for Productivity and Abitur indicate that subjects who are faster in solving a problem 
and have better grades are significantly more likely to self-select into the variable pay 
schemes. This sorting pattern is intuitive and exactly what economic theory would 
predict.5 Subjects who are slow or have relatively high costs of solving the problems 
are better off choosing the fixed payment, while highly productive subjects can earn 
much more in the variable than the fixed payment schemes. 
Interestingly women are significantly less likely to sort into variable payment 
schemes than male subjects. This effect is large; women are about 20 percent less 
likely to select into variable pay. It suggests that, controlling for productivity6, women 
seem to dislike the uncertainty and/or competitiveness that is inherent to variable pay 
schemes. This gender specific sorting pattern is also found in experiments that analyse 
sorting decisions between variable pay schemes that vary the degree of 
competitiveness, e.g., piece-rate vs. tournament. In these experiments, women favour 
less competitive environments (see, e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).  
A major difference between fixed and variable pay is that the former is a risk-
free option while the latter involves uncertainty and risk. Economic theory therefore 
predicts that the more risk tolerant an agent is the more likely he should self-select 
into the variable pay ceteris paribus. Results in Table 1 show that subjects who are 
relatively willing to take risks are significantly more likely to self-select into variable 
                                                 
5 See also Cadsby et al. (2007), who report corroborative evidence on productivity sorting in which 
subjects had the choice of working on an anagram word-creating task. 
6 Note that women solve less problems than men. Including more detailed controls for productivity 
therefore reduces the gender effect (see Dohmen and Falk 2010). 
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pay, as predicted. As indicated by the marginal effects estimates, being one point 
more risk averse on the 11-point scale reduces the likelihood of selecting into variable 
pay by about 5.5 percentage points. This means that for a given productivity variable 
pay attracts relatively risk tolerant agents.7  
In column 2 we also include personality indicators. Personality has not 
received much attention in economics in general (Borghans et al., 2008) and it is 
therefore not surprising that little is known about the relation between personality and 
sorting into different payment schemes or firms. This is a real shortcoming because 
personality probably matters to firms as much as other more standard personal 
characteristics, such as formal qualifications or ability. In fact, employer surveys 
suggest that so-called “soft skills” such as reliability or positive work attitudes are 
rated by employers as more important than prior work experience or technical skills 
(Regenstein, Meyer, and Hicks, 1998; Becci et al., 2005; Atkinson and Williams, 
2003). This explains why firms make use of personality tests in their hiring process 
(see, e.g., Autor and Scarborough, 2005). We believe that personality is also relevant 
in the education system, given the close and intense personal interaction between 
teachers and students. Our personality measure was developed by Hermann 
Brandstätter (see Brandstätter, 1988).8 Column 2 shows that personality sorting is not 
particular pronounced in our pooled data set. Only the personality trait “ability to 
                                                 
7 It is interesting to note that the gender coefficient is larger without controls for risk attitudes. This is 
intuitive since women are generally less willing to take risks than men. This holds in our sample of 240 
subjects as well as in a large representative sample from the SOEP (see Dohmen et al., 2010). Thus at 
least in part gender specific sorting can be explained by gender specific risk attitudes. 
8 This so called 16 PA test is a short form of the German-language version of Cattell’s sixteen 
personality factor questionnaire (16 PF), developed by Schneewind, Schröder and Cattell (1983). 
Sixteen primary factors of personality are constructed based on 192 items, and can be summarized in 
five independent secondary factors. The Brandstätter test presents subjects with 32 conflictive adjective 
pairs. For each adjective pair, subjects rate how well an adjective pair describes their personality on a 
9-point scale. Linear combinations of these 32 ratings produce the five secondary factors, following a 
procedure described by Brandstätter (1988). The coefficients of these linear combinations were 
determined in a regression analysis, in which each of the five secondary factors that were obtained 
from the 16 PF-test of Schneewind, Schröder and Cattell (1983) was regressed on all 32 items of the 16 
PA test for a sample of 300 individuals who had completed both tests.  
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work under pressure” is weakly significant, indicating that people who are relatively 
able to work under pressure have a higher tendency to self-select into variable pay. 
The fact that other traits are not significant could imply that personality as measured 
by the Brandstätter questionnaire is not strongly related to selection decisions into 
variable pay.9 
Table 1 
To sum up our data suggest that incentives systematically affect sorting in multiple 
dimensions. Variable pay schemes systematically attract people with different 
abilities and individual characteristics than fixed pay contracts do. In particular, more 
productive subjects sort into the variable pay schemes, while relatively risk averse 
subjects are less likely to self-select into variable pay. Women are less likely to sort 
into variable payment schemes, an effect that seems to be driven in part by risk 
preferences. It is noteworthy that on top of the selection patterns we also find a 
straightforward incentive effect. According to self-reported measures of work effort, 
stress and exhaustion we find that subjects in variable pay schemes provide 
significantly more effort. They also feel more stressed and exhausted than subjects 
working for the fixed payment (for details see Dohmen and Falk 2010). 
 
3. Selection in the Field 
Building on our laboratory findings, in this section we move from the lab to the field. 
We first study differences in individual characteristics of employees in the private vs. 
the public sector before we explicitly study self-selection of teachers. In Germany, 
teachers are employed in the public sector, which is largely characterized by fixed 
payment schemes. In addition the threat of unemployment is basically absent in the 
                                                 
9 One should note, however, that we have pooled our data in Table 1. If we look at sorting decisions 
separately by different incentive schemes and gender, personality differences are more pronounced. 
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public sector, in particular for civil servants. In contrast the risk of layoff provides 
strong performance incentives in the private sector. We would therefore expect a 
similar sorting pattern as is shown in Table 1, both for public employees as well as 
teachers. Using data from the SOEP we run a similar regression as in Table 1 
including measures for productivity, risk preferences, gender, social preferences and 
personality. 
The SOEP is a representative panel survey of the adult population living in 
Germany. To ease comparison with our laboratory data we use school grades as 
productivity proxies. Risk attitudes are measured by the exact same measure as in 
Table 1. We also include measures for social preferences, as they are relevant for the 
design of optimal contracts (Fehr and Falk, 2002) but also because they could be 
relevant for teachers as we will discuss below. Social preferences are measured in 
terms of trust and reciprocity. The trust measure is the principal component of 
answers to three questions in the 2003 wave about individuals’ trust attitudes (cf. 
Dohmen et al., 2008): (1) In general, one can trust people. 2) These days you cannot 
rely on anybody else. 3) When dealing with strangers it is better to be careful before 
you trust them. The four answer categories were labelled: strongly agree, agree 
somewhat, disagree somewhat, strongly disagree. Similar to the survey risk measure 
the trust measure has been validated in a paid experiment.10 Reciprocity is measured 
as positive and negative reciprocity: The measures are obtained by averaging 
respondents’ agreement (on a 7-point scale) to three statements each.11 Agreement to 
                                                 
10 Fehr et al. (2002) summarize an individual’s responses to the three survey questions about trust using 
factor analysis, and then show that this combined measure is a significant predictor of the amount that a 
first-mover actually sends to the other player, in a paid trust game experiment. 
11 The measure for positive reciprocity is based on the following three statements: If someone does me 
a favor, I am prepared to return it; I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me 
before; I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before. The measure for 
negative reciprocity is based on the following three statements: If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take 
revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost; if somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will 
do the same to him/her; if somebody insults me, I will insult him/her back. 
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these statements is indicated on a scale from 1 (meaning “does not apply to me at 
all”) to 7 (“applies to me perfectly”). 
 We restrict the sample to employees who have completed a high school exam 
(Abitur) in order to ensure that we compare teachers to other employees with a similar 
educational background: A formal requirement for teachers in Germany is to 
complete university study. The Abitur is a prerequisite for entering university. Our 
sample consists only of individuals who are not older than 65 and are currently 
neither enrolled in school, nor in vocational training, nor in university. Furthermore, 
we drop observations with item non-response on the high-school grades in math and 
German, gender, age, risk attitude, as well as the trust and reciprocity measures. This 
leaves us with a sample for analysis that covers 1521 individuals among whom 608 
work in the public sector and 287 are teachers (high school teachers, primary school 
teachers, university professors and teachers in various other education institutions). 
Results of Probit estimates, in which the dependent variable is an indicator 
variable for working in the public sector, are shown in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 
2.12 Column 1 shows a weak and insignificant productivity effect as measured by the 
average math and German grade at age 17. Women are significantly more likely to 
work in the public sector; and public sector employees are significantly less willing to 
take risks than private sector employees. Given the differences with respect to risk 
and uncertainty in the private vs. the public sector, this is exactly what we would 
                                                 
12 In the following some caution in interpreting the selection effects is warranted. When comparing 
employees in the private and public sector (and teachers vs. other employees) we do not only compare 
differences in the incentive structures but also different jobs with job specific characteristics. While in 
the experiment we kept the task constant while changing incentives, we now compare job-incentive-
bundles. In this sense some of the characteristics that we identify as being relevant for sorting may 
depend on specific job characteristics, not just on different incentive structures. Unlike with our 
experimental data it is also possible that in the SOEP data attitudes and preferences are endogenous to 
the work environment, rendering causal interpretations difficult. 
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expect. It also corroborates our laboratory findings.13 We also detect significant 
differences with respect to social preferences. As shown in Column 1, employees in 
the public sector trust more than in the private sector. This effect, however, becomes 
insignificant once we include the Big Five personality indicators in Column 2. 
Table 2 
The Big Five is a wide spread scientific attempt to classify personality traits. Each of 
the Big Five factors comprises many different, specific characteristics of personality. 
The Big Five taxonomy serves an integrative function because it can represent the 
various and diverse systems of personality descriptions in a common framework. 
Although being the most used concept, it has also been criticised. For example, it has 
been pointed out that there is no theory why one should cluster personality reliably 
into 5 groups (and there are alternative suggestions using different numbers of 
factors). Moreover, the Big Five model suppresses important sub-factors, which might 
explain important individual differences, such as persistence, motivation, regulation 
of motivation etc. (compare Borghans et al., 2008). The 2005 wave of the SOEP 
contains a short version of Big Five, including 15 items, three for each factor (for 
details see Gerlitz and Schupp, 2005). Respondents are offered different adjectives 
and indicate whether they apply or not on a 7-point scale (compare Table 3). 
Table 3 
In Column (2) of Table 2 two factors turn out to be significant: public employees are 
less conscientious and more open to experience. High values in conscientiousness 
imply that a respondent “does a thorough job”, does not “tend to be lazy” and “does 
things effectively and efficiently”. Employees in the public sector are significantly 
less conscientious compared to those working in the private sector. The other factor, 
                                                 
13 Additional complementary evidence is provided by Bonin et al. (2007), who find that individuals 
who are more willing to take risks are more likely to work in occupations with higher earnings 
variability. 
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openness to experience, is measured by the following items: “is original”, “comes up 
with new ideas and values artistic experiences” and “has an active imagination”. This 
factor is significantly higher for public employees.  
We now turn to the selection profile of teachers and analyse how teachers 
differ from other employees, i.e., we compare teachers to all employees in the SOEP 
who have obtained a schooling degree that qualifies them for attending university 
(Abitur). We estimate Probit models in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 in which the 
dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual has self-selected into a teaching 
profession. 
The results are similar to those that we obtain when comparing employees 
from the public with those in the private sector (see Columns (1) and (2)). The 
marginal effects estimates of the Probit model in Column (3) indicate that women are 
about 13 percent more likely to become teachers than men. In terms of personality 
and attitudes, there is a significantly negative correlation between willingness to take 
risks and the probability of selecting into the education sector. Under the current 
payment schemes, which are characterised by fixed salaries and job security, risk 
averse individuals are significantly more likely to become teachers. The coefficient 
indicates that for each point on the 11-point questionnaire scale, the likelihood of 
becoming a teacher changes by almost two percentage points. We also find significant 
effects concerning social preferences: teachers are significantly more trusting and less 
negatively reciprocal compared to the comparison group (see Column 3). In Column 4 
we include personality indicators according to the Big Five model. It turns out that 
teachers are less “conscientious”, indicating a relatively low work attitude. 
Up to this point we have treated teachers as a homogeneous group. We think 
that this is justified to the extent that most teachers face a similar incentive structure, 
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all being employed in the public sector and having comparable job characteristics. 
There are, however, some notable differences. For example, high school teachers have 
some limited promotion opportunities, which are more or less absent for primary 
school teachers (see Wößmann, 2008). Also the job profile and the required 
qualifications differ substantially between school teachers and university professors. 
In order to investigate how differences in incentives and job profiles among teaching 
careers might trigger differential sorting patterns, we estimated a multinomial logit 
model in which the dependent variable comprises the reference group of non-teaching 
professions and five categories for different teaching subgroups: primary school 
teacher, junior high-school teacher (Hauptschule, Realschule), high-school 
(Gymnasium, Gesamtschule, Berufsschule), college and university and other teaching 
professions. The results, which are shown in Table 4, largely corroborate our findings 
from Table 2, but they also provide additional interesting insights. A comparison of 
primary school teachers and university professors illustrates this: First, and not 
surprisingly, the gender effect is different for university professors than for primary 
school teachers. While the latter are significantly more likely to be female, the former 
are more likely to be male. In terms of productivity as measured by grades we find 
that grades are better for university teachers and worse for primary school teachers. In 
terms of risk, reciprocity and trust most coefficients are similar and have the same 
sign, which holds interestingly for all teacher types. Note, however, that high school 
teachers are less risk averse than primary school teachers, which is consistent with 
differences in the promotion opportunities across these two sub-groups. In terms of 
personality, primary school teachers are significantly less “conscientious”, while 
university professors are more “open to experience” and show less “extraversion”.  
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To sum up we find systematic differences between employees in the public vs. 
the private sector as well as between teachers and those working in other occupations. 
Our laboratory findings suggest that systematic self-selection produces these observed 
differences. These selection effects are important when considering the consequences 
of introducing monetary incentives for employees in the education sector, for at least 
three reasons. First, changes in incentive schemes create potential tension and 
dissatisfaction. The reason is simply that employees in the education system, i.e., 
teachers, who have (optimally) self-selected into the education system based on the 
premise that remuneration is characterised by non-contingent pay would be 
confronted with payment schemes that make payments contingent on output and 
performance. If the selection decision was optimal, the new work environment will 
not be satisfying, i.e., for a given salary job satisfaction of teachers would drop. This 
effect will last until a newly selected sample of teachers will be in place. The 
reduction in utility may lead to resistance against pay for performance reforms, 
potentially leading to conflict and reduced effort and lower quality of teachers’ work 
output. Second, and related to this first point, it may not be efficient to intensify 
monetary incentives if teachers are genuinely risk averse. A well-known insight from 
incentive theory is the existence of a trade-off between risk and incentives. Take a 
simple linear incentive scheme 
 β  (1) 
where w is the wage, α is a basic compensation independent of output, β is the 
incentive intensity and   is output, which is a combination of effort and luck, i.e., 
 , with   = effort and   is an error term. Under the assumption of a risk 
neutral principal, the efficient incentive intensity β is 
  (2) 
 19
where P’(e) is the marginal profit increase in effort, r is a measure of risk aversion of 
the agent, c’’(e) measures the sensibility of effort reaction to a change in b (de/db = 
1/c’’(e)) and Var(ε) measures the precision of measuring effort. Here we are 
interested in the relation between preferences and incentives. According to equation 
(2) the efficient level of β is lower, the higher the risk aversion of the agent. The 
intuition is that incentives expose agents to risks, for which they have to be 
compensated. Thus, if teachers are relatively risk averse, variable pay schemes are 
less efficient than if teachers were risk neutral. 
Third, the results in Tables 2 and 4 suggest that people who show relatively 
high levels of trust and low levels of negative reciprocity feel less attracted by 
variable pay. In other words one would expect that introducing variable pay in the 
educational system may eventually crowd in teachers who are less trusting and more 
negatively reciprocal at the cost of the current teacher profile. We can only speculate 
that changing the composition of teachers along this dimension may adversely affect 
the educational production process. For example, teachers are important role models 
for students and affect attitude formation of their students. Evidence shows, for 
example, that social preferences such as trust are partly determined by environmental 
factors (Dohmen et al., 2006). Dohmen et al. (2009) use SOEP data and show that the 
less negatively reciprocal people are, the lower is their unemployment risk and the 
higher their subjective well-being. In terms of the role model argument it is therefore 
good news that teachers are significantly less negatively reciprocal. In this sense, 
there is the danger that introducing variable pay attracts the “wrong” teachers. On the 
other hand we have seen a mild effect of productivity and a systematic effect along 
the Big Five factor conscientiousness. Introducing variable pay may increase average 
productivity of teachers as well as the fraction of conscientious teachers, i.e., teachers 
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with positive work attitudes. We do not know whether the overall impact of changing 
incentives and thereby changing the composition of teachers is positive or negative; 
but we can say that the composition will be different and that this effect should be 
considered when considering the optimality of introducing incentives in the education 
system. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have argued that introducing incentives has two distinct effects, an 
incentive effect and a selection effect. In a laboratory experiment we have shown that 
fixed vs. variable pay schemes attract systematically different types of workers, along 
several dimensions. A similar multi-dimensional sorting pattern was also observed 
among employees in the public vs. private sector as well as among teachers and other 
employees. We have further argued that changing incentives will affect well-being of 
those employees who have self-selected into a particular job and, in the long-run 
change the composition of employees. These effects need to be accounted for when 
changing incentive schemes in organisations. 
 Incentive induced sorting effects are likely not only relevant for teachers, i.e., 
the supply side of education, but also for students, i.e., the demand side. Changing 
incentives that relate to the financing of the education system, e.g., by introducing 
tuition fees for students, alters incentives to invest in education and will therefore 
affect the composition of students. Since the costs of an investment in human capital 
accrue in the present (in the form of tuition fees, forgone earnings and psychic costs), 
while the private financial returns of such an investment manifest only in the future, 
the human capital model (Becker, 1975; Mincer, 1958 and 1974; Ben-Porath, 1967) 
predicts that a higher discount rate is associated with lower levels of educational 
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attainment (Hause, 1974). Likewise, uncertainty about the returns to education 
implies a negative relationship between an individual’s degree of risk aversion and 
educational investment (Levhari and Weiss, 1974; Hartog and Diaz Serrano, 2007).14 
Exploring how risk and time preferences affect educational choice is therefore an 
important issue for future research. If educational investments depend on these 
preferences, it is of similar importance to assess how personal and socio-economic 
characteristics determine  preference heterogeneity. For example, if higher parental 
wealth is associated with more willingness to take risks, individuals from wealthier 
families are more inclined to invest in schooling ceteris paribus, and policies that 
increase uncertainty about returns to education would predominately deter individuals 
from poorer households from studying.  We believe that understanding how 
preferences and incentives interact to determine sorting decisions in the education 
sector is crucial for policy design. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Selection into Variable Pay: Experimental Data 
      
  (1) (2) 
   
Productivity -0.002** -0.002** 
 [0.001] [0.001] 
High-School GPA (Abitur grade) -0.140*** -0.127** 
 [0.051] [0.057] 
Female -0.198*** -0.281*** 
 [0.069] [0.080] 
Risk attitude 0.055*** 0.041** 
 [0.019] [0.021] 
Norm-orientation  -0.049 
  [0.033] 
Ability to work under pressure  0.049* 
  [0.027] 
Independence  -0.014 
  [0.030] 
Readiness to take decisions  -0.011 
  [0.027] 
Extraversion  -0.011 
  [0.027] 
PR 0.086 0.098 
 [0.082] [0.085] 
RS 0.112 0.144* 
  [0.081] [0.086] 
Observations 235 218 
Pseudo R-squared 0.123 0.136 
The table reports marginal effect estimates of Probit models evaluated at the mean of 
explanatory variables. Standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** 
at 1%. Sample: Participants in Experiment. Dependent variable takes value 1 if subject 
chooses variable pay. PR is a treatment dummy for piece-rate treatment; RS is a 
treatment dummy for the revenue-sharing treatment. The productivity measure is the 
time in seconds that an individual needs to solve a multiplication problem of difficulty 
level four correctly (see text for details). 
Sample: Experimental data.  
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Table 2 
Selection in the Field: SOEP Data 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Average grade 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.019 0.016 0.012 
 [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
1 if female 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.150*** 0.134*** 0.123*** 0.105*** 
 [0.027] [0.028] [0.030] [0.021] [0.021] [0.023] 
Age (in years) 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Risk attitude -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 0.017*** 
 [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Trust 0.028** 0.022 0.021 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
Positive 
reciprocity 0.012 0.012 0.012 -0.004 -0.009 -0.009 
 [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] 
Negative 
reciprocity -0.013 -0.017 -0.017 -0.021*** -0.022*** 0.022*** 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Conscientiousness  -0.026* -0.026*  -0.022** -0.021* 
  [0.016] [0.016]  [0.011] [0.011] 
Extraversion  -0.020 -0.021  0.008 0.008 
  [0.015] [0.015]  [0.011] [0.011] 
Agreeableness  0.009 0.008  0.014 0.013 
  [0.016] [0.016]  [0.011] [0.011] 
Openness to 
experience  0.039** 0.040**  0.017 0.018 
  [0.016] [0.016]  [0.011] [0.011] 
Neuroticism  0.006 0.006  0.009 0.009 
   [0.015] [0.015]  [0.010] [0.010] 
Years of full-time 
experience   0.001   -0.001 
   [0.003]   [0.002] 
Years of part-time 
experience   0.004   0.002 
   [0.005]   [0.003] 
Observations 1521 1502 1502 1521 1502 1502 
Pseudo R-squared 0.060 0.064 0.064 0.158 0.161 0.164 
The table reports marginal effect estimates of Probit models evaluated at the mean of explanatory 
variables. Standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The dependent 
variable in Columns (1)  - (3) takes value 1 if the respondent works in the public sector and 0 
otherwise. The dependent variable in Columns (4) - (5) takes value 1 if the respondent is a teacher 
(including any type of teaching profession and heads of school) and 0 otherwise. The sample is 
restricted to all employed individuals younger than 65 who are currently not enrolled in education and 
who have obtained a schooling degree that qualifies them for attending university. Average grade is 
average grade in Math and German (at age 17).The measure of positive reciprocity is the individual's 
average level of agreement to three statements concerning, respectively, willingness to return a favour, 
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to go out of the way to help somebody who was kind, and undergo personal costs to help someone who 
was helpful before. The measure of negative reciprocity reflects average agreement to statements 
concerning willingness to take revenge for a serious wrong, to retaliate for being put in a difficult 
position, and to respond to an insult with an insult. Answers are always on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 
means “does not apply to me at all” and 7 means “applies to me perfectly.” The measure of trust is the 
standardized principal component of the individual's level of agreement with three different statements 
regarding the trustworthiness of others (agreement is measured on a four-point scale from “agree 
completely” to “disagree completely”) that were included in the 2003 wave. The measure is obtained 
from a principal component analysis on the estimation sample. 
Sample: SOEP 2004; measures of Big Five and reciprocity based on the 2005 wave; measures of trust 
based on the 2003 wave. 
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Table 3 
Big Five used in the Socio-Economic Panel 
You will probably find that some apply to you perfectly and that some do not apply to you at all. With 
others, you may be somewhere in between. Please answer according to the following scale: 1 means 
“does not apply to me at all”, 7 means “applies to me perfectly”. With values between 1 and 7, you 
can express where you lie between these two extremes
Factor Adjectives 
Conscientiousness does a thorough job; tends to be lazy; does things effectively and efficiently 
Extraversion is communicative, talkative; is outgoing, sociable; is reserved 
Agreeableness 
is sometimes somewhat rude to others; has a forgiving nature; is considerate and 
kind to others 
Openness to 
experience 
is original, comes up with new ideas; values artistic experiences; has an active 
imagination 
Neuroticism worries a lot; gets nervous easily; is relaxed, handles stress well 
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Table 4 
Personal Characteristics and Type of Teaching Career 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Primary 
school 
teacher 
Teacher at 
junior high 
school 
High school 
teachers 
College/ 
University 
professors 
Other 
teachers 
Average Grade 0.438* 0.445*** -0.279 -0.603** 0.365 
 [0.249] [0.149] [0.175] [0.285] [0.240] 
1 if female 1.739*** 1.626*** 0.141 -0.556 1.427*** 
 [0.438] [0.249] [0.271] [0.472] [0.394] 
Age (in years) 0.091*** 0.102*** 0.110*** 0.033 0.051*** 
 [0.022] [0.013] [0.015] [0.021] [0.019] 
Risk attitude -0.258*** -0.173*** -0.132** -0.143 0.079 
 [0.094] [0.056] [0.063] [0.102] [0.093] 
Trust  0.161 0.486*** 0.305** 0.401* 0.273 
 [0.202] [0.125] [0.135] [0.217] [0.182] 
Positive 
reciprocity -0.195 0.080 0.020 -0.161 -0.451** 
 [0.230] [0.148] [0.164] [0.241] [0.204] 
Negative 
reciprocity -0.101 -0.263*** -0.093 -0.206 -0.036 
 [0.165] [0.098] [0.104] [0.183] [0.147] 
Std. 
Conscientiousness -0.428** -0.094 -0.175 -0.098 -0.104 
 [0.201] [0.133] [0.144] [0.234] [0.205] 
Std. Extraversion 0.031 0.087 0.201 -0.402* 0.175 
 [0.209] [0.127] [0.145] [0.208] [0.214] 
Std. 
Agreeableness 0.339 0.126 0.014 0.102 0.074 
 [0.230] [0.134] [0.150] [0.251] [0.210] 
Std. Openness to 
experience 0.080 -0.027 0.072 0.544** 0.480** 
 [0.214] [0.129] [0.154] [0.250] [0.227] 
Std. Neuroticism -0.011 0.165 -0.008 -0.139 0.088 
 [0.202] [0.122] [0.142] [0.219] [0.181] 
Constant -7.493*** -8.279*** -6.765*** -1.902 -5.494*** 
  [1.948] [1.218] [1.349] [1.862] [1.715] 
Observations 1502 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.158 
Multinomial logit estimates with standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The reference category is non-teaching profession. Teacher at junior high school comprise 
Hauptschule and Realschule. High-school teachers comprise Gymnasium, Gesamtschule and 
Berufsschule. For details on sample restrictions and variables see notes to Table 2. 
Sample: SOEP 2004; measures of Big Five based on the 2005 wave. 
 
 
